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COURTROOM, CODE AND 
CLEMENCY: 
REFORM IN SELF-DEFENSE 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR 
BATTERED WOMEN 
Panel Discussion l 
SUSAN RUTBERG: Hello, I'd like to welcome all of you to the 
Feminist Jurisprudence Speaker Series. This presentation is the 
second in a series for this academic year and we are very grati-
fied to see all of you here: Our topic today is Courtroom, Code 
and Clemency: Reform in Self-Defense Jurisprudence for Bat-
tered Women. We are lucky to have with us today three women 
who have worked in this field and who have experiences to share 
with us from very different perspectives. Our fourth panelist is a 
survivor of years of battering who became a criminal defendant 
charged with first degree murder when she killed her abuser. My 
name is Susan Rutberg and I teach here at Golden Gate Univer-
sity Law School. I would like to recognize and thank the women 
who helped to organize this panel discussion. First, the students: 
Sarah Hughes, Gina Harmon, and Rosanne Calbo-Jackson. Sec-
ondly, we would like to thank Professor Joan Howarth for all of 
her assistance in helping to organize this panel. Lastly, we would 
like to thank the Dean of the Law School, Tony Pagano, for the 
support that the law school has given this speaker series. 
1. This article is a reproduction of a panel discussion which took place at Golden 
Gate University School of Law in January 1993. Of the four panelists who participated in 
the discussion, three panelists' comments are reprinted here. Thanks to Gina Harmon, 
Sarah Hughes and Rosanne Calbo-Jackson for their work, along with the Golden Gate 
Feminist Jurisprudence Speaker Series, in organizing this event. Much appreciation goes 
to Karen Brkick for her help in typing this article and to Rosanne Calbo-Jackson for her 
editing of this article. Also, thanks to Richard Karoly for filming the panel discussion. 
Finally, thank you to Professors Joan Howarth, Maria Ontiveros and Susan Rutberg of 
Golden Gate University for their advice when things got a little rough. 
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Our first speaker this afternoon is Rebecca Isaacs who is 
currently Associate Director of Legal Services for Women Pris-
oners with Children, formerly Director of Battered Women's Al-
ternatives Legal Advocacy Program and co-chair of the Califor-
nia Alliance Against Domestic Violence. Following Rebecca we 
will hear from Professor Cathleen Ridolfi. Cathleen is also 
known as Cookie Ridolfi. She's a full-time law professor at Santa 
Clara Law School where she currently co-directs the Law Clinic. 
Previously she taught a criminal defense clinic at CUNY Law 
School in New York, and formerly was a criminal defense lawyer 
with the Philadelphia Defender Organization. Cookie was the di-
rector of the Women's Self-Defense Law Project at the Center 
for Constitutional Rights in New York in the late 70's and actu-
ally is a pioneer in the use of Battered Woman Syndrome evi-
dence and in the development of strategies for trial, specifically 
designed to aid battered women in self-defense cases. Our fourth 
speaker is Harriette Davis. In 1982, Harriette was found guilty 
of voluntary manslaughter in connection with killing a man who 
had abused her for eight years. She is here with us this after-
noon to give us her perspective on the criminal justice system, 
its treatment of her, to tell her story and to tell us about her 
work now with the California State Commission on Women in 
Prison. Thank you all for your attention. Rebecca. 
REBECCA ISAACS: Hi, I thank you for inviting me here today 
as I think this is very timely. I think once the issue gets on the 
cover of Time Magazine, you know it's an issue that's really ar-
rived. For any of you who haven't seen it, this is the latest issue 
of Time Magazine (with the issue of Battered Women on the 
cover). As of January 1, 1992, Section 1107 of the California Evi-
dence Code became new law. Titled "Evidence Regarding Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome", it allows in expert testimony regard-
ing Battered Woman Syndrome by either the prosecution or 
defense in a criminal action. It specifically includes as part of 
Battered Woman Syndrome the physical, emotional or mental 
affects upon the beliefs, perceptions or behavior of victims of do-
mestic violence. A note regarding the legislative history states 
that the Legislature does not intend Section 1107 of the Califor-
nia Evidence Code to preclude the admissibility of evidence of 
Battered Woman Syndrome under other statutory or case law. 
Today I want to use the example of the passage of Section 
1107 as a prism through which to raise questions about the legis-
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lative process and its relationship to the Battered Women's 
Movement. It is a narrative that reveals both the compromise 
and power of using the legislative process as a forum for launch-
ing broader public awareness of domestic violence. 
In California, the major domestic violence lobby is the Cali-
fornia Alliance Against Domestic Violence (CAADV) which is a 
coalition of over 100 domestic violence programs throughout the 
State and which sponsors criminal justice in family law legisla-
tive committees. These committees have been extremely success-
ful in sponsoring, supporting and opposing legislation in Sacra-
mento for the past several years, including an annual package of 
legislative proposals which is presented at an annual meeting 
with legislative aides who select bills for their prospective legis-
lators to carry. 
The process of codifying Section 1107 has been several years 
and much negotiation in the making. The legislation was first 
introduced as Assembly Bill 2613 in 1990 by assembly member 
Jerry Eaves rather than by the CAADV. Domestic violence ac-
tivists thought that the bill had numerous problems and it was 
killed in conference committee' after women's groups objected to 
amendments which were exclusionary and actually more limiting 
than then current case or statutory law. 
Assembly member Eaves reintroduced the flawed bill again 
in the 1991 legislative session as Assembly Bill 785 and the Alli-
ance again mobilized to defeat it or force changes in the bill. I 
thought that the bill included some of the problems of poor con-
struction that have plagued other State statutes including lan-
guage limiting Battered Woman Syndrome evidence to cases in-
volving spouses, which would almost surely have been construed 
as married heterosexual couples. 
A second limitation which we objected to was the exclusion 
of civil cases. Increasingly Battered Woman Syndrome is being 
used in civil cases to explain, for example, why in a custody ac-
tion, a woman would fail to protect her children from a batterer 
or why she would sign an extremely disadvantageous marital set-
tlement agreement. 
Finally, CAADV was committed to pushing for legislation 
3
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which declared the admissibility of experiences of battered 
women as a way of ensuring that a jury would hear about the 
abuse she suffered. We feared that the use of the term Battered 
Woman Syndrome would focus expert testimony on the psycho-
logical state of the battered woman rather than on the history of 
the abuse. When Assembly Bill 2613 was introduced the year 
before, the Bill made no mention of Battered Woman Syndrome 
at all. Instead it stated partially "in any action, expert testimony 
is admissible regarding the nature and effect of physical, sexual 
and emotional abuse on the behavior, beliefs or perceptions of 
persons in a domestic relationship including descriptions of the 
experiences of battered women." The bill was heavily amended 
after opposition was mounted by prosecutors, highlighted by the 
lobbyist for the district attorneys shouting that this bill was tan-
tamount to a "license to kill men." When Assembly Bill 785 was 
signed in 1991, CAADV had lost the broad language regarding 
the experiences of victims of domestic violence - now the statute 
refers to Battered Woman Syndrome. Assembly member Bar-
bara Friedman carried a CAADV sponsored attempt this year to 
amend the statute to reintroduce the experiences language. The 
attempt was unsuccessful and the opposition was even more or-
ganized. This time both Governor Wilson's office and the Office 
of Criminal Justice Planning were actively opposed to adding 
the language "the experiences of victims of domestic violence." 
They argued that this was a dangerous expansion of defendants' 
rights and a major change in the law of self-defense. The Gover-
nor's representative threatened a veto of the whole bill, which 
contained other important provisions, so we agreed to drop the 
language. 
As you can see it's an ongoing struggle, so when Jayne2 talks 
about the incredible shortcomings of Battered Woman Syn-
drome legislation, I really agree with her. A shortcoming of the 
law in general is that people tend to think that passage of a stat-
ute will solve a particular problem in the case of battered women 
who are convicted of killing their abusers. There's a sense that 
admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome evidence will ensure 
an acquittal by a jury. This process is further complicated by 
the limitation of the term "Battered Woman Syndrome." 
2. Jayne Lee was the panel participant whose comments are not reprinted in this 
piece. 
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There's also a tendency for policy makers to think that expert 
testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome is the key to keeping 
abused women who kill their abusers out of prison. The implica-
tions are dire for clemency movements which appeal to state 
governors to commute the sentence for battered women who kill 
their abusers. 
In Ohio, for example, where the largest number of women 
were granted clemency, Governor Celeste justified his actions on 
the grounds that there was a state Supreme Court decision spe-
cifically barring such testimony until 1990. In Maryland, the 
clemency effort also relied heavily on the inability of the women 
to introduce evidence in their trials. In fact, many women are 
convicted and sentenced for first and second degree murder even 
with expert testimony. A statute allowing Battered Woman Syn-
drome evidence is not necessarily going to prevent convictions, 
but policy makers may feel that there is no longer a problem. 
There are several other problems with laws regarding Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome admissibility. First, in California, some 
would argue that Section 1107 was unnecessary because Bat-
tered Woman Syndrome evidence is admissible anyway under 
the People v. Aris case. I am not convinced having attended a 
District Attorney Seminar on Domestic Violence during which a 
prominent district attorney called for a prosecution strategy to 
overturn Aris. Secondly, expert testimony should include a 
broad conception of battering in society, including the obstacles 
faced in leaving a relationship, social and cultural factors, the 
dynamics of abuse, as well as the specific experiences of the wo-
man on trial. Battered Woman Syndrome, first developed by Dr. 
Lenore Walker in the 1970's, is partly based on the theory of 
learned helplessness which posits that women become passive in 
the face of continued abuse over which they have no control. In 
fact, women react in many different ways in abusive relation-
ships because of different experiences and because of race, class 
and cultural differences. Judges' who are resistant to letting in 
evidence of abuse may choose to narrowly construe Battered 
Woman Syndrome and thereby screen out those who do not fit 
the normative model. 
Finally, use of the term Battered Woman Syndrome has 
connotations of a pathological state of mental deficiency which 
5
et al.: Courtroom, Code and Clemency
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
834 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:829 
challenges a woman's competency and credibility. The focus is 
on the woman's state of mind rather than on the experiences of 
abuse and the survival techniques she employs to deal with the 
abuse. The Syndrome also maintains attention on the woman 
and looks to her to explain her goal in an abusive relationship, 
rather than focusing on the batterer and his behavior and acts. 
This is exemplified by a new legislative proposal which refers to 
a battered woman's "mental defect." In summary, lobbying, me-
dia representations, clemency petitions and organizing are all at-
tempts to heighten public education and awareness of domestic 
violence. The issue of battered women in prison for killing their 
abusers is a profoundly political one which exists in the public 
arena. Public support is critical. Particularly in a state like Cali-
fornia, in which the Governor is unsympathetic to prisoners and 
reluctant to grant parole in most cases in which prisoners are 
serving long sentences and are eligible for parole. 
A legislative hearing at the California Institution for 
Women in 1991 galvanized the number of legislators to do some-
thing about battered women in prison. Since that hearing, there 
have been ongoing requests by legislators for ideas for clemency 
and self-defense related legislation. Legislators participate in 
raising public awareness because they respond to relatively pop-
ular women's issues like domestic violence - this is even more 
the case with other domestic violence legislation which is prose-
cution oriented. 
To date clemency-related legislation, either past or current, 
includes: 1) a resolution from the Assembly asking the Governor 
to review cases of women incarcerated for killing their abusers; 
2) a bill mandating Battered Woman Syndrome Training for all 
commissioners who review clemency petitions; and 3) a bill ad-
ding Battered Woman Syndrome as a specific criteria for clem-
ency consideration in the clemency statute. 
The Governor and many other Legislators have made it 
clear that Section 1107 of the Evidence Code is as far as they are 
willing to go on the issue of battered women and self-defense, 
although several other proposals will be submitted this session. 
Still there are several reasons that the passage of 1107 and the 
legislative arena in general is important. Domestic violence is an 
appealing women's issue for Legislators since it has bipartisan 
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appeal both as a victims' rights issue for conservatives and a 
feminist issue for progressives. 
Politicians in both the executive and legislative branches 
are pressured by battered women and activists to address the 
inequities which put battered women in prison. The sympathetic 
images of battered women 'portrayed over the last decade are not 
easily reconciled with harsh prison terms. The media plays a 
critical role in educating the public about the issues of domestic 
violence and women in prison for killing their abusers. Unfortu-
nately, media attention is double edged because it is necessary 
to keep the issue alive and to pressure· the Governor even as too 
much media exposure can jeopardize the women's appeal for 
clemency. In order to get a "balanced" view, the media interview 
prosecutors and family members of the deceased abuser. The 
media and the public seem captivated by two poles of represen-
tation. One portrays women as further beaten by a system that 
not only failed to protect them, but then locks them up for long 
periods. The other focuses on titillating the audience with 
images of women who kill and so step beyond the bounds of gen-
der expectations into a "vigilante world of revenge." -[Along with 
the impressive organizing by prisoners in groups such as Con-
victed Women Against Abuse at the California Institution for 
Women, domestic violence activists and private attorneys repre-
senting the prisoners, legislation and legislators, personal com-
mitments have helped to attract and to sustain media attention. 
Media attention also focuses on the failure of the system in pro-
tecting battered women. I agree with Holly McGuigan that bat-
tered women who kill their abusers need defense attorneys and 
judges who apply existing self-defense theory and law correctly. 
I also think that this public political process and media focus 
help create the climate and awareness for judges and defense at-
torneys to be more aware of battered women's issues. In the end, 
the problem of domestic violence can only begin to be resolved 
by taking it out of bedrooms and courtrooms and into the arena 
of public consciousness. 
SUSAN RUTBERG: Thank you. We will hear next from Cookie 
Ridolfi. I wanted to remind all of you that 'questions are wel-
come, but we ask that you hold them until all of the panel have 
presented their ideas and then you may either come forward and 
ask your questions here at the microphone or pass them down 
on the cards that you've been provided with and they can be 
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asked from up here. Cookie. 
COOKIE RIDOLFI: As Susan explained, most of my work has 
been in the courtroom although most recently I find myself in 
the classroom. My recent work on this issue has been with the 
California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison, with the 
other speakers on this panel, Rebecca Isaacs and Jayne Lee. The 
focus of this project has been to take the cases of battered 
women convicted of killing their abusers, to review their trials or 
the circumstances of their pleas, do new investigations and in 
many of these cases, submit petitions to Governor Wilson asking 
for executive clemency. 
As our project began, I was drawn by the question of what 
exactly we were dealing with when we were asking for executive 
clemency. What is clemency? On what basis does the executive 
grant it? Is there a right to executive clemency? Is it a political 
favor? Or is it something else altogether? Despite my years as a 
criminal defense attorney, I had no experience with this particu-
lar legal maneuver, for want of a better description, and I had 
questions about what we were asking for. And so I decided to 
take a closer look. I did a little probing into the origins and pur-
pose of the executive pardoning power and that's what I'm going 
to focus on today. 
What I found was that the pardoning power is a universal 
principle which has existed since ancient times and still exists in 
every country of the world except China. In the United States, it 
is explicitly spelled out both in the Federal Constitution and in 
most state constitutions, including California. To understand 
why it's important enough to be considered in the Constitution 
itself, you have to look to the records of the Constitutional con-
ventions, which I did with respect to both the Federal Constitu-
tion and the California State Constitution. 
Although there was no explicit constitutional right to an ex-
ecutive pardon set out in the Federal Constitution, it was under-
stood to be an essential and integral part of the criminal justice 
system that the framers were devising. There wasn't a lot of de-
bate at the Constitutional Convention about the executive par-
doning power, probably because most of the framers were well 
steeped in English law and had accepted the pardoning power as 
a necessary and integral part of any system of justice. Since 
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there wasn't much debate in the records of the constitutional 
conventions, I went to the Federalist Papers, which are made up 
of a series of essays explaining the purpose of the Federal Con-
stitution. It's there that you really get a sense of what the par-
doning power is about. As you've undoubtedly heard, one of the 
major criticisms of the exercise of the pardoning power is that it 
violates separation of powers principles. It is often argued that 
when the executive grarits clemency, he is interfering with the 
role of the courts, whose job it is to resolve questions of criminal 
responsibility and to punish people, and also interfering with the 
role of the legislature that writes the laws that the courts follow. 
Ironically, if you look at these early documents you find 
that these criticisms can't be more off base. In fact, if you read 
the convention records and the Federalist Papers, it is clear that 
the pardoning power was incorporated as a necessary comple-
ment to the other branches. The drafters understood when they 
put this package together that the lawmakers, no matter how 
careful, thoughtful, fair-minded and well intentioned they may 
be, are never going to be able to write laws that fairly anticipate 
every situation. Additionally, the courts, because they make er-
. rors and because they are bound by the laws that the legislature 
makes do not always justly resolve cases. It is precisely for these 
reasons that the pardoning power was given force. Its purpose is 
as an essential safety-net for the public good. Once it is under-
stood to be essential to a fair system, as a necessary and impor-
tant part of the structure of the criminal justice system, then it 
follows, in my mind at least, that the. executive, who is entrusted 
with the exercise of the power, has an obligation to exercise it in 
appropriate cases for purposes of justice and mercy. I purpose-
fully distinguish the justice reasons from the mercy reasons and 
I'll explain why in just a moment. 
Before getting to that issue though, it is necessary to con-
sider, assuming that I'm correct that the executive has a duty to 
exercise the power, the circumstances under which the power 
should be exercised and the way battered women's self-defense 
cases fall within that construct. 
I suggest that there are really three proper areas for the ex-
ercise of the pardoning power. First there is the situation of fac-
tual innocence, second there is the case of technical guilt where 
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there are significant mitigating factors and third, there is the 
most challenging category which I call technical guilt with moral 
mnocence. 
The first situation needs little explanation. Many of you 
may have seen or heard of the movie, *The Thin Blue Line. The 
movie tells the story of a man wrongly convicted of murder and 
imprisoned for many years before it was eventually determined 
that he was innocent. I don't need any argument to convince you 
of the justification for clemency in this case. 
An example of the second category, technical guilt with sig-
nificant mitigating factors, is the recent California case of Rob-
ert Alton Harris. As you recall, Harris wasn't asking for a full 
pardon but was seeking a more limited use of the pardoning 
power. He was looking for a commutation of sentence from a 
death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. The basis of 
his claim was that, because of his extraordinarily harsh upbring-
ing, the cruelty with which he had always been treated and the 
fact that there was evidence that he suffered from brain damage 
prior to the kidnapping and murders, execution in his case was 
unjust. 
Another example in this second category are the cases of 
people serving sentences whose circumstances change dramati-
cally after the imposition of sentence. The most recent notable 
cases are the cases of people who are suffering with AIDS. For a 
person really sick with the virus, a five-year sentence in a bur-
glary case is likely to be a life sentence. For that individual, de-
spite the fact that he is guilty, there are significant mitigating 
factors that warrant, while perhaps not a full pardon, 'a commu-
tation to a shorter sentence. 
The third category is what, I call technical guilt but moral 
innocence. I have an old example to share with you. It's actually 
a thirteenth century case of a six year-old child named Cathe-
rine Passcavant. Catherine opened a door and accidently pushed 
a younger child into a vat of hot water. The younger child died. 
The law at that time did not provide for an infancy defense and 
there was no requirement that the prosecutors prove criminal 
intent. Technically, she was guilty of murder, but morally, I 
hope you agree with me, she was innocent. After having been 
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found guilty of murder, the only remedy for th~t child was for 
her family to go to the King and beg for a pardon which, in this 
case, the King granted. That's a non-battered woman's example 
of what I call the technical guilt/moral innocence category. The 
child was technically guilty under the law, because the law at 
that time didn't have the insight to provide for an infancy de-
fense. Under correct application of the strict law, Catherine 
would have been executed, but for the King's pardon. 
All three of these categories - factual innocence, mitigating 
factors, and moral innocence - justify clemency in battered 
women's cases. Indeed, the whole question of the legal treatment 
of battered women may be very much like the problem of the 
infancy defense in the thirteenth century case of Catherine 
Passcavant. Just as the thirteenth century law of murder devel-
oped to deal with the cases in which one adult killed another, so 
has the modern law of self-defense been patterned on the cases 
in which it most often arises - where one man kills another. 
The law of self-defense as it is currently being applied in the 
cases of battered women tried for murder does not lead to fair 
treatment for these defendants given their unique circum-
stances. This calls into question whether "justice" in its 
broadest sense is ever rendered in these cases. 
As it has been pointed out, this society has had an inade-
quate response to the circumstances of battered women. Bat-
tered women have little or no protection by the system. Yet, 
when they kill, they are prosecuted with the same, or even 
greater fervor, than another person in a similar circumstance. In 
addition, despite the common misconception that there is some 
special battered woman self-defense and that battered women 
have an easier time at trial, as you heard from Jayne and Re-
becca, this is a myth. Battered women are prosecuted under the 
exact same laws that men are - a man who kills another man in 
a barroom brawl is tried and prosecuted and has available to 
him the same law of self-defense as a battered woman. More-
over, the combination of public misconceptions and laws 
designed to deal with very different contexts make fair trials for 
battered women problematic. Further, where there has been law 
reform, in many instances those reforms have only added obsta-
cles to these women in this situation. There is gre!lt confusion, 
for example, over the use and admissibility of expert testimony 
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on Battered Woman Syndrome, in some cases causing more 
damage to the defendants. For these reasons, in the context of 
the three models that I propose include ripe areas for the exer-
cise of the pardoning power - there are battered women self-
defense cases which fall within each of the three. 
First, within the context of the factual innocence model, 
there are cases where the proper application of the law of self-
defense would have protected her. In many cases, the law as 
written should have resulted in an acquittal, but for reasons 
such as jury bias or the trial court's failure to issue fair jury in-
structions, the battered woman does not receive a fair trial and 
is unjustly convicted. 
As Susan pointed out, my work in this area began in the 
early 1970's when I was working with the National Jury Project, 
and as I think Jayne already said, the idea at that time of rais-
ing self-defense on behalf of a woman was a really radical thing. 
Up until then, lawyers routinely pled women to a lesser charge 
or pled her to some charge in exchange for probation, or raised 
an impaired mental state defense. The reason was that the law 
of self-defense requires that there be a finding of reasonableness. 
Because of negative attitudes about women, lawyers expected 
that it would be very hard to sell jurors on the idea that women 
could be reasonable. Given these expectations, it was considered 
bad strategy to raise a self-defense claim on behalf of a woman 
whatever the facts. That was not so long ago. 
At any rate, at the time self-defense was beginning to be 
raised, I was working on these cases as a jury worker. It was my 
job to study juror attitudes and verdicts in these cases. It was 
clear from early on that there are many dangerous myths and 
misconceptions about battered women which really harmed 
them at trial. Commonly, a juror can't understand why a woman 
stays in her situation; if she stays with a batterer she's consid-
ered to be lying or exaggerating or somehow masochistic. An-
other common myth is that because battered women often don't 
report the abuse, the prosecutor is in a very comfortable position 
of arguing that it is not credible now where she is, after the fact, 
claiming that she was abused. And perhaps the biggest problem 
is in jurors' understanding of why a battered woman perceives 
the threat of great bodily harm or death as being imminent as is 
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required under the law of self-defense. Jurors have a difficult 
time understanding that her perception is reasonable, and in 
some cases, they need an explanation which is beyond the ken of 
the average juror. That's what Jayne was talking about with re-
spect to expert testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome, which 
as you have heard is a double-edged sword. So, in many of these 
cases, the defendant, even under existing law, should have been 
acquitted outright, but instead faces a lengthy prison sentence 
because of the inability of the criminal justice system to address 
these issues fairly. 
The second category of the clemency model, that of techni-
cal guilt with significant mitigating factors also includes cases of 
battered women convicted of killing their abusers. There are 
cases where the woman may be guilty under the law which con-
victed her, but the mitigating circumstances surrounding her 
case are so compelling that a commutation of sentence is called 
for. An excellent recent example of this is the New York case of 
Jean Harris. Jean Harris was convicted of second degree murder 
in the death of her lover, Dr. Tarnower. At trial, she argued that 
the killing was accidental, that she intended to kill only herself, 
and that the gun went off accidentally when Dr. Tarnower tried 
to take it away from her. The jury rejected the defense and con-
victed her. The trial court judge was recently quoted as saying 
that, while he agreed that she should not have been acquitted 
entirely, the murder conviction was too severe. He believed that 
the killing was a product of the defendant's emotional condition, 
a condition that was at least in part caused by the prescription 
. medication Dr. Tarnower had prescribed for her. Accordingly, 
the trial judge said that he believed a manslaughter conviction 
would have been more appropriate. Governor Cuomo, in com-
muting Harris's sentence emphasized that she had served twelve 
years of a minimum fifteen year sentence, that she was in poor 
health and might die in prison, and that she had worked hard on 
behalf of other inmates. Both types of factors - - mitigating fac-
tors not fully taken into account in the conviction and sentenc-
ing and mitigating factors that arise after sentencing - - make 
clemency appropriate, the former on ground of justice, the latter 
on grounds of mercy. 
The third category, which presents a very interesting ques-
tion, is the technical guilt/moral innocence category. A good ex-
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ample of this is the case of Brenda Aris, which is a case now 
sitting on Governor Wilson's desk. Brenda had been married to 
Rick Aris for twelve years at the time of the killing. They had 
three daughters, all under the age of 10. When she met him she 
was just sixteen years old, he was in his mid-twenties. She was 
very naive and he was the first man that ever paid attention to 
her. She fell in love with him and married him when she was 
seventeen. There were witnesses at her trial who testified to nu-
merous instances of severe physical and verbal abuse. These wit-
nesses included members of Rick's immediate family who testi-
fied on behalf of Brenda. 
Over the years she .had been bruised, her jaw had been bro-
ken and wired, and her ribs had been broken. She left him many 
times through the course of their marriage, always returning; 
first because she really believed that he would change, and later, 
because of his threats that he would kill her and her family. 
They had no telephone in the house. They had no car and she 
had no access to one. The only time Rick allowed her to go out 
of the house without him was to go up to the corner store. He 
repeatedly threatened when he abused her that if she called the 
police he would kill her. In the four to six weeks before the kill-
ing, Rick beat her on a daily basis. Most of the information I've 
described was provided at trial. During the same four to six 
week period, using either a gun or a knife, he threatened her life 
no fewer than four times a week. When he wasn't with her, he 
locked her in the bedroom and put a padlock on the outside of 
the door. On the day of the shooting, he had consumed large 
quantities of alcohol and drugs and he had beaten her many 
times during that day. At one point, while he was beating her, in 
her words at trial she said "he was pulling my hair back real 
hard to where my neck felt like he was breaking it and I had 
yelled you're breaking my neck, and he began hitting me and 
telling me he didn't think he was going to let me live until morn-
ing." Rick then passed out from the combination of drugs and 
'alcohol. Brenda testified that she knew it wasn't over and that 
she was sure that when he woke up he'd pick up where he left 
off. She believed and she testified that she was convinced he 
would carry out his threat, and that she would not live through 
the night. Brenda waited ten minutes, making sure he was 
asleep, and then she shot him. 
14
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At her trial, Brenda's lawyer tried to introduce expert testi-
mony that Brenda suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome. 
An expert had evaluated Brenda and concluded, based on meet-
ings with her, that she was a battered woman suffering from 
Battered Woman Syndrome. The trial court, while allowing an 
expert to testify about the syndrome in the abstract, wouldn't 
allow the jury to learn the expert's opinion that Brenda suffered 
. from Battered Woman Syndrome. The jury convicted Brenda 
Aris and they cried as they returned their verdict. Later, in con-
versations with lawyers, the jurors said that because they had 
heard testimony about Battered Woman Syndrome but were not 
told that Brenda suffered from the Syndrome, they thought they 
were not allowed to conclude that she did. They said they be-
lieved that if Brenda suffered from the syndrome, the expert 
would have said so. So here is an instance, similar to what Jayne 
was talking about, where the use of an expert actually hurt her 
more than helped her. 
Another major problem in the Aris case was the trial court's 
refusal to instruct the jury on perfect self-defense. In California, 
a defendant is entitled to a complete defense if she honestly and 
reasonably believes that her use of deadly force is necessary to 
protect herself from death or serious bodily injury. Here, the 
trial court said that Brenda was not entitled to a jury instruction 
on perfect self-defense because no reasonable jury could have 
found that she reasonably feared imminent danger from her 
sleeping husband. The trial court's decision was affirmed by the 
intermediate appellate court in a published opinion and is now 
precedent in California for "burning bed" cases, the generic 
name for cases where the alleged victim, the abuser, is asleep at 
the time a woman acts in self-defense - - which in many cases is 
the only time a woman believes she can safely act to defend her-
self. Following Aris, the law in California holds that a woman is 
not entitled to a self-defense instruction ina situation where she 
kills her batterer while he sleeps, even if there is no other time 
that she can protect herself in safety, because, in the court's 
view, no reasonable jury could find that she really feared that 
she was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. 
The Aris case involves two of the three categories that jus-
tify clemency. There are outstanding mitigating factors in her 
case and, despite the harshness of the law and the finding of 
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technical guilt, Brenda Aris is morally innocent. Certainly, she 
was hurt by the jury instructions given and the jury's erroneous 
conclusion that resulted from the judge's ruling. The long abuse 
she endured, and the fact that she has three children should also 
be considered as mitigating factors. But the central issue is the 
defense of self-defense. Even if the law continues to define self-
defense in such a way as to preclude acquittal in cases where the 
defendant kills an unconscious or sleeping "victim", that does 
not dictate the moral validity of a murder conviction. The long 
abuse Brenda Aris suffered, the failure of the law to provide 
meaningful protection, and a full understanding of Battered Wo-
man's Syndrome - including appreciation for the likely accuracy 
of Brenda's perception of danger - all suggest that she is not 
morally guilty of murder in very much the same sense that the 
child who accidently pushed another child into a vat of boiling 
water wasn't guilty either. It is precisely in those cases where the 
law - - the rigid rules of courts and legislatures - - doesn't yet 
fully take into account the demands of individual justice that 
the clemency power assumes its greatest importance. 
I'm not going to take up much more of your time, but I just 
want to underscore the fact that we're not really asking Gover-
nor Wilson for a favor. Given the nature and purpose of the par-
doning power, Governor Wilson has an obligation to exercise the 
pardoning power for the public good, in the interest of justice 
and mercy. 
HARRIETTE DAVIS: Hi. I guess I've been asked to speak be-
cause I'm admittedly a person who has been a victim of domes-
tic violence. As a result of it, I had to defend my life and went 
through the "injustice" system and prison. I'll just start out tell-
ing you a little bit about myself. A lot of times before when I 
would speak about domestic violence, people would say, well 
you're different and I would say no. Of course, my experience is 
my own, but it's so similar to many of the women throughout 
the world and the United States. 
I was born to mixed parentage and identify myself as, an 
African American woman. I grew up in a family with two older 
sisters and a single parent. My mother raised us. She was very 
independent, very strong, working to support us. When I was 
about fourteen or fifteen, we moved to California from Ohio. 
When I was about sixteen years old, I had a child, a son. I fin-
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ished high school and graduated. After I graduated, I wanted to 
move away from home because I felt I needed some time off 
from school to spend with my son. He was two weeks old when I 
went back to school. I needed to put my head together. I wanted 
to take a year off and then go to college. 
The summer after I graduated, I met Henry. It was a chance 
meeting. He was a very intelligent person, very strong and very 
considerate. We dated for awhile and I thought we were a good 
match, kind of opposites. I was kind of liberal, outgoing and 
wanted things in life and he was the sa'me way except he was 
real conservative. There was a lot of respect and caring between 
us. When the relationship first started out, there was a lot of 
courting, a lot of wining and dining so to speak. We spent a lot 
of time together. I'm the kind of person who is very considerate 
and very sensitive to other people's needs. Normally, we would 
spend almost every day together, so if I was going to be away or 
if I had other things I was going to do, spend time with my fam-
ily or friends or something like that, I would always give him a 
call or let him know. We'd speak the night before and I would 
tell him my plans for the next day. A few months into the rela-
tionship, he began to expect that type of thing from me. One 
time I had gone out and left a note on the door saying, "I'm 
going to the store, see you later." I was going shopping at Cap-
well's. The store closed at nine. 
I was gone all day and when I came home that evening 
Henry was really upset, saying he didn't know what I was doing 
or who I was with. He went into a tirade and I told him okay, 
next time, I'll be sure to let you know. I just took it kind of 
lightly. As the relationship progressed, there were other liberties 
that he began to take from me. I'd be on the phone and the 
phone would be busy for an hour and he would ask, "who were 
you talking to?" I would tell him it was a friend or family or 
whatever and I was just talking to them. He would say, if you're 
going to be on the phone for a long time, why don't you let me 
know and I won't try to get in touch with you because it's taking 
time from my work. 
So, there were little liberties, that at the time I didn't really 
see but, that I was conceding to him. I'm a very independent 
person and I always have been, but this time during my life for 
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some reason, I gave away that independence and that right to be 
my own person. 
The first incident of violence occurred after we had some 
problems and an argument. He hit me, he slapped me. I can't 
remember, it was maybe two or three times. When he did this, I 
understood the anger and why he was that angry and felt that 
he could hit me, but at the same time I did not accept it. So, I 
broke up with him and said I didn't want to see him anymore. I 
didn't want to be around him and I wanted the relationship to 
end. He said fine, he could understand that. I told him I didn't 
allow anybody to put their hands on me. He understood and I 
went my way. I guess a couple of days- had passed and he called 
me up and said he wanted to talk and that he was sorry. I did 
talk to him. In talking to him, he went through this whole apol-
ogy thing, telling me how much he loved me and how much he 
respected me and he didn't know what happened and you know 
it wouldn't happen again. He kind of blamed it on me and I felt 
guilty because it was an action that I had taken which had an-
gered him. I would have been angry if he had done it to me but 
the difference is that I would not put my hands on him. So, I 
forgave him and the relationship went on. 
I think it was at that time that I just kind of began to lose 
it. I was already kind of scared of him. I had never been scared 
of him before, but I knew the power of what it felt like to be hit. 
At the same time, I was giving parts of myself away, my inde-
pendence and not knowing it. I can't really remember the next 
time that he hit me, but I can remember times he hit me and 
knocked me into a wall and made a hole into the wall with an 
imprint of my body. I just know at that time, I was already 
afraid to leave. I felt like I couldn't involve my family, I thought 
I had put myself into a situation that I had to get out of. I felt if 
I had gotten into that relationship, that I could get out of it. 
Here was a person that at one time was rational and intelligent 
and someone that I could talk to. Now, he wasn't like that at all. 
When I would say, that I don't want to be with you, I'm scared 
of you, you're hurting me, he did not even hear it. In fact, it 
would make him even more angry and it would cause him to 
hurt me more. As time went on, there were things that I couldn't 
do. I couldn't talk on the phone unless I had his permission, I 
couldn't go to the store. I couldn't go anywhere without his per-
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mission, not even to see my family. My friends stopped coming 
over because he would come over and make it uncomfortable for 
them. My friends and I couldn't communicate as much on the 
phone because he would make it uncomfortable for me to talk 
on the phone. If I went anywhere, he would time how long it 
took me to go and come back. The only people that he allowed 
me to see over a matter of time was my mother, my two sisters, 
and his family. 
I began to feel like there was no way out of the relationship. 
Actually, I believed there was no way out. I had tried to run 
away because I-thought there was no way out for me. I was so 
depressed. I just felt so much pain that I tried to commit sui-
cide. My sister came and she found me. Henry had a key to the 
house and had to let her in to the house to revive me. During 
this time, they had a big fight because she told him that he was 
killing me and that she blamed him for everything that was hap-
pening to me. I don't really remember because I had taken 
sleeping pills, but my sister told me that they had had this argu-
ment. He hit her and told her not to come around anymore. 
From that time on, because she had questioned him, she was not 
allowed in the house. 
Shortly after this, I found out I was pregnant with my sec-
ond child. I was about twenty years old then. During the time 
that I was pregnant, he also beat me. I can remember when I 
was about six months pregnant and he kicked me. I know that 
this sounds real mechanical. I remember when I was in court, I 
testified to what he did. He kicked me, he hit me, he did this 
and that. It was a whole line of things. When someone is doing it 
to you, it's not like you can make a list because it sounds real, 
real cold. But he did, he kicked me, he choked me, he pounded 
me, he threw me down, he did all kinds of things to me. At one 
point, I just started to feel cramping and have slight bleeding. I 
remember just telling him that I hope that he just went on and 
kicked the baby out of me because that's what he was doing. I 
told him I was glad because I had never wanted to have a child 
of his, or anything of his in this world. At that point in time, it 
just snapped him. For the next three months, he didn't put his 
hands on me. Luckily, my daughter was born healthy and there 
were no complications. She's seventeen years old now. 
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He also made threats to my family. He threatened that if I 
left him he would harm my family. There were times that I tried 
to leave and each time I left, the threats increased. First, if I left 
he would get me. After I got over the fear that if he got me, then 
there wouldn't be anything more that he could do to hurt me. 
Then he said that if I left and took the baby again, I would leave 
and take the baby, he would do harm to my family. I believed 
him because of the type of person he was. He said he would 
never do the harm, that he knew people that he could pay to off 
my sister. Then he said that if I left again, he would kill every-
one in my family. He knew that would bring me back. He would 
start with my sister, my grandmother and then go all the way 
down until I would have no one in my family left. So, I guess 
somehow I overcame that fear and at some point, I just took my 
two children and I left. I left everything in my home, I took very 
few personal possessions that I immediately needed, clothing, 
some towels and canned goods. I did everything I could. I pulled 
out all of my money out of the bank, I paid all my bills off and 
cut off my telephone and PG&E (utility). The only people who 
knew where I was were my mother and my two sisters and their 
husbands. 
Well, I was gone a few months and he found me and called 
me up. I remember how I felt. It was cold and raining and' it had 
been raining for days. I had been in Los Angeles with some peo-
ple who were kind enough to take me in. I really didn't go out 
too much because I was scared. I felt like that if I went outside, 
somehow, he would find me. I was always looking over my shoul-
ders. I remember this day, it was raining really hard and it 
looked like it was nighttime, but it was still day. The streets 
were flooding and I needed to go to the store and get some food, 
some milk and bread, and some soup. I was just kind of waiting, 
just hoping that the rain would let up. I was dozing off when the 
phone rang. I picked up the phone and when I said hello, he 
called my name and he told me not to hang up. He said that he 
knew where I was and that if I left, he would have the house 
blown up and anywhere that I went, he would destroy the people 
that helped me. I still hadn't said anything and I mostly just 
listened for probably half an hour without saying anything, try-
ing to think of an escape. 
My mind was just racing, trying to figure out what to do 
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and what was going on. I was stunned. Finally he said he just 
wanted to see his daughter. He said that if I tried to leave, there 
was a man outside on the corner watching the house. The first 
thing I thought was, how did he know the house was on the cor-
ner. How would he know? I looked outside and there was a man 
, outside in the rain across the street. Henry said that he didn't 
want to hurt me and that he had been talking to my mother. He 
understood how much he had hurt me and he just wanted to see 
his daughter and be a part of her life. He said that he was com-
ing to get her, to see her. Then he came and he said that he 
wanted to take her. He wanted to just talk to me and find out 
why I had done what I did. At first, I began to explain to him 
the pain he caused not only me, but my children. My daughter 
was two years old and ever since she was born, she was watching 
me being beaten. I told him both my children were being hurt 
by this. I knew that sooner or later, he was going to kill me if I 
didn't get away from him. At first, he was kind of understanding 
but then he told me to come home and to bring the children 
back because they shouldn't be separated from their family. I 
told him I didn't want to come back and that I wanted to go to 
school and to get a career. I wanted to be a nurse. I wanted to 
follow that career and I had just actually signed up for city col-
lege in Los Angeles. 
At first he said no, I don't think that's what you ought to 
do. Then he became more and more forceful. I said yes, I do 
want to do that and then I told him he could take his daughter 
back with him if that's what he wanted to do and that I 
wouldn't object to that. I guess in my mind I thought that if he 
took her, I would be able to get strong enough to be able to go 
and take her back. I just figured that that's what I would do, but 
that's not what he wanted. Finally, I told him that 1 wasn't go-
ing back. Then he started, how dare you talk to me like that, are 
you telling me no? I said, no, I'm not telling you no, I just don't 
want to go. The whole pattern of the relationship began to un-
fold. It was a tone of threat in the words he was saying without 
saying it directly. So I said, no, I'm not and then he said again, 
are you telling me no? I said no, I'm not telling you no. He said, 
oh, you're not? Then you're coming? I said, no I'm not coming. 
Oh you're telling me you're not coming? And so it progressed 
like that to the point where I went because I had no choice but 
to go. 
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I went back. He had kept my apartment for me and every-
thing, so I just moved back into it. First, he said that he would 
just allow me to be free of him. He just wanted to show me that 
he could be the kind of person that wouldn't abuse me and that 
we could kind of have this separate relationship. He said he just 
wanted to maintain contact with his daughter and my son w1,1om 
he had raised since he was two and considered his son. At that 
point, I guess I felt strong enough to tell him that there was 
nothing in the world that he could ever do to make me want to 
be with him because I would always be scared of him and I 
would always remember the things that he had done to hurt me 
and they would always be there and I could never love him as a 
woman loves a man. I now, in a way, regret that. 
For about six months, he did seem to try and he didn't re-
ally put his hands on me. But, he still maintained control over 
me with indirect threats. I guess you would have to know and I 
have to say that I know about I've read about Battered Woman 
Syndrome and I had testimony to it, and I feel that I, myself, 
suffered from an illness based on my experience with my bat-
terer. During the first six months, there was no physical vio-
lence. I can't quite remember what happened, but he ended up 
hitting me and beating me up again and finally, we got to the 
point where he said, fine, I could move away and be separate 
from him. She cashed in all of her savings and she bought a 
house for me and my children to live in. He said he didn't want 
us in the area that he was living in and I couldn't really afford to 
live anywhere else. After she bought the house, he told me I 
couldn't move. 
Well, in my mind, I guess I thought I would do it anyhow 
and that if I could get away long enough, I would be safe. He 
was supposed to go out of town one day and I attempted to pack 
up and put everything away, but he came over about 6:30 in the 
morning and caught me trying to move and beat me pretty se-
verely. I tried to run out the door, and down the street away 
from him and he had a friend that was waiting outside in his 
van. He called to him and I ran down the street without any 
shoes or anything. I just ran down the street and they finally 
caught me and dr~gged me back in the house. Someone called 
the police and said that there was a woman that had been 
beaten and was being dragged down the street. It took the police 
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over forty-five minutes to respond to that call. I didn't know it 
then, but I found out later. When they came, the policemen 
stood at my front door and I stood about twelve to fifteen feet 
away from him with Henry next to me. The policeman asked us 
our names and whether there had been a problem. We said no, 
and he asked if everything was okay and I said yeah and he left. 
Well, Henry beat me up again, but his friend was out in the van 
and I guess he was making some noises from snoring. The neigh-
bor called the police and said she thought that the woman who 
had been beaten earlier had been stuffed in a van and was dying. 
It took the police an hour to respond to that call. 
I never called the police myself because, in the community 
where I come from, this is something that's normal. If the police 
came to situations that involve domestic violence, they would 
usually put blame on the woman. They wouldn't tell her about 
her rights. If you did put someone in jail, if you did have the 
nerve to put someone in jail, the bail was so low or they'd be 
released on their own recognizance and they'd be out in a matter 
of hours. In my mind, I believed that if I ever did anything like 
that and he got out, he would kill me or hurt someone in my 
family. That wasn't something I was willing to give up. I wasn't 
really willing to die then either because I felt like my children 
were the most important things in my life and I had to be there 
for them. 
Right after this, the beatings were less frequent, but they 
were worse. One night, he beat me because my mother had been 
over and he said that anytime my mother came over, I changed. 
I remember that he beat me so bad and when he went to sleep, I 
went over to my mother's house. It was probably five or six 
o'clock in the morning and when she opened the- door, my mom 
just broke down and started crying. She said if she hadn't 
known me, my shape and my hair, that she wouldn't have 
known who I was because my face was so distorted. It looked 
like some kind of monster that you would see on the Twilight 
Zone or Outer Limits shows. 
He called me there. Every time I left, my daughter would 
have seizures and she would get sick. I guess that was a guilt 
trip. He would call and say she was sick or that he had taken her 
to the hospital and she needed me, and that I needed to come 
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back home and that the kids and I don't need to be separated. I 
would always go back home. I have to tell you that when I ran 
away and he found me, he told me he put private detectives on 
me. I guess in my mind that just sealed my belief that there was 
nowhere I could go to get away from him. I also didn't believe 
that the system would protect me. 
Well, one night, not too long after Easter, there was a pro-
gram my son was in at school and my mother had gone to see it 
with me. Afterwards Henry and I went through the same argu-
ment that when my mother came around, I changed. He told me 
that he was going to stop me from seeing my mother and that 
she wasn't going to be allowed over to the house anymore and 
that my children weren't going to have any contact with her. I 
guess in my mind it was almost then like being dead because I 
didn't have anyone else. I called my mom and talked with her 
for a few hours and I told her what he had said. She assured me 
that she wouldn't allow that to happen, and that I was her 
daughter, and that she would be there and we would figure 
something out. 
After I talked to her, he called and he was angry. It was 
around 2:00 in the morning when I had gotten through talking to 
her and he wanted to know why I had been on the phone for so 
long. I told him I had talked to my mom. He came over not too 
long after that. He had a key but he always had me answer the 
door, and this time when I answered the door, he just hit me. All 
I can remember is that, just being hit right then. I don't remem-
ber what happened right after that but, over a period of four 
hours, he hit me and banged my head against the wall and threw 
me down on the ground and slapped me and kicked me and he 
choked me and twisted my arm and did almost anything you can 
think of that someone beating a person up could do, things you 
wouldn't even do to an animal. At one point, he held my head 
and I think he was just banging it against this wall over and 
over, and his eyes were blood red. I felt that I didn't even know 
the person that was doing this to me. There was nothing in his 
face that I could recognize. I felt he had no feelings for me, that 
he could just do this to me. I knew I couldn't go through this 
again and that he was going to kill me. He did stop and he said 
that he was going to rest and that after he rested he was going to 
finish what he started. And then he went to sleep. 
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There was a gun at the head of the bed that he gave me for 
protection. I felt like I had to get away. My son was sleeping in 
the other bedroom. I just knew that I had to get out of there and 
I picked up the gun and I was going to leave. People always ask 
me, why did I pick up the gun? In my mind, for whatever rea-
son, I was going to get out of there, and there was nothing that 
was going to stop me. I guess in the back of my mind, I knew 
that if I had to use the gun, I would use the gun. All I wanted to 
do was to get away, I knew that I just didn't care and that I 
would never come back. At one point, I bumped the bed and 
when I bumped the bed, he woke up and called my name and I 
shot him. After I shot him, he lay there for I don't really know 
how long. I don't know. I just know that they say a "reasonable 
battered woman," but a "reasonable person". I know that I 
wasn't reasonable because I thought he was going to get up and 
beat me up for shooting him. That's what was going through my 
mind. At some point, I did realize that he wasn't going to get up 
and that I had shot him and that he couldn't get up. I woke up 
my son and had him get his sister and go to my mother's house. 
Then I called an attorney that my sister had been working for, 
and after that I was. arrested and charged with first degree 
murder. 
I went through the system. There are a lot of similarities in 
my case to what has been described. I did have an expert wit-
ness, I had a lot of testimony from people (neighbors and fam-
ily) who had been around, and who knew about the beatings. 
The district attorney had evidence even before they charged me 
with first degree murder about the beatings that they never did 
acknowledge. They tried to portray me as someone who was vin-
dictive and jealous and cold blooded, and someone who came 
from a family too intelligent to be put in that position. They 
said that I could have reached out and gone into a shelter, of 
which I think there was probably only one in the entire East 
Bay that I knew of at that time. The jury found me guilty of 
voluntary manslaughter. I don't really think that they could ever 
understand why I was so scared or why I felt like I might actu-
ally die. Afterward, one of the jurors said that, if she was going 
to leave, she would have taken her purse, and why didn't I take 
my purse with me? That right there, in my mind, just really 
showed me that they couldn't understand that someone who's in 
fear for their life does not really think rationally about what 
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they're doing. I don't even think the judge, who was a woman, 
really understood because when she went to sentence me, after I 
expressed my deep regrets for the pain that the families felt, my 
family, his family and even for his death. She said that she felt 
like that was the only time the truth had been told during the 
whole trial. His family did not acknowledge any of the abuse, 
even though his mother knew about it. 
I ended up getting five years probation, which I violated a 
few months later. I went through a ninety day observation at the 
California Institute for Women, while I was pregnant. When I 
got out, I violated probation by driving under the influence of 
alcohol. They suspended my probation and sent me to prison for 
six years. After getting out of prison, and during my last seven 
months of prison, I went through a program called Mother/In-
fant Program that allows women to have 'their children with 
them, from birth to six years, in a residential community pro-
gram. I also went through a semester of college there and, after I 
got out, I finished and received my nursing degree which 
brought me to the California Commission on Women which is 
studying the special needs of women and their families in the 
California prison system. Rebecca is also a member of that com-
mission. They wanted a woman who was an ex-prisoner and who 
has children. We're now halfway into our findings and we will be 
going down to Southern California to the California Institution 
for Women and to the California Rehabilitation Center which is 
for civil narcotic addicts, to finish our investigations. Thank you. 
SUSAN RUTBERG: Thank you for telling your story. We have 
some time for questions if there are some questions. Yes - would 
you like to stand at the microphone. 
Q. How long a period of time did this go on? 
A. (Harriette Davis): It was an eight year relationship. It proba-
bly started about six months into the relationship. 
Q. You indicated that you gave up little liberties as you went 
along and you finally said that just before something your whole 
relationship came about that he was going to go to sleep and he 
was going to finish the job. 
A. (Harriette Davis): He said he was going to finish what he 
started ,when he got up. 
Q. And what came into my mind as you were saying that was, 
essentially by giving up those little liberties, you gave him the 
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/5
1993] COURTROOM, CODE & CLEMENCY 855 
power to feel that he was omnipotent in the whole situation, 
that he could do what he did to you, go to sleep and even tell 
you that he was going to finish what he started and expect to be 
able to get up and do it. 
A. (Harriette Davis): That's exactly right, he put a gun to my 
head one time, and he actually put the gun in my hands and 
told me to shoot him. He told me he knew that I hated him and 
that I could end it all right then. I couldn't even imagine doing 
that and I told him no. Then he took the gun and put it to the 
temple of my head and called me a name and told me that I 
better never think about anything like that because before I 
could do it, he'd blow my brains out. You're right, unknowingly 
and unwittingly, I did, over a matter of time give him that 
power. 
Q. Is that something in your background and also in other back-
grounds of battered women that you've seen or is that something 
common? I'm assuming it is. 
A. (Harriette Davis): I think it begins psychologically. It began 
psychologically for me, but I can't speak for all women. There 
are some similarities, but I think that for me, it was psychologi-
cal into physical. 
Q. Yes, I'm Maria Ontiveros and I'm a professor here at Golden 
Gate. First of all, I'd like to start off by thanking Harriette for 
sharing her story with us. A lot of us here feel it is not so much 
something that you gave up or you did, but it was something 
that he took. And that's sort of a comment on the prior ques-
tion. I do have another question as well that is really directed to 
Jayne. Can you give us in some basic terms and some of the 
specific gender traits that you see which are embodied in the 
model that don't describe the experiences of women of color, or 
poor women, or lesbians, or maybe in particular that would ex-
clude people like Harriette. You talked a little bit about learned 
helplessness and how that would be a contributing factor, but 
are there other things more specific that you could identify to 
help us? 
A. Answer deleted at request of panelist. 
A. (Rebecca Isaacs): Just to add, it seems very important to look 
at the perpetrator and figure out what's going on with someone 
who has that violence, anger and need to control. I think it's 
really important to focus our energies on not why somebody is 
abused and beaten, as if that's somehow a choice, but to look at 
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the abuser and try to figure out what's going on there. 
A. (Harriette Davis): I'd like to make a comment. I think that 
when I said that, it was a personal thing because I had been 
such an independent person and the type of relationship that I 
ended up having with him and the things that I did for him, I 
would probably never do or have done for anyone else. But I felt 
like I was giving to him. On any other personal level, I think 
that when two people respect each other, and they have a rela-
tionship of giving, that it's two sided, even in a family. With my 
mother, I would let her know where I'm going to be or around 
what time I'd be home, or things like that. She would do the 
same to us as children out of respect. A parent does not have to 
tell a child where they are going or what they are doing, but just 
out of consideration and respect for the family they normally do, 
in case there's a problem or so they don't worry. Those are the 
kinds of things I did with him that I would do with other people, 
but in other ways, he did not respect me and it wasn't two sided, 
he used that against me which I didn't realize at the time. 
A: (Cookie Ridolfi): Actually now that we've set some kind of 
ground work I would like to refer specifically to one case that 
happened in New York. It involved an older African-American 
woman, about fifty five. She in fact had Lenore Walker testify. 
She was able to introduce expert testimony on Battered Woman 
Syndrome and Lenore Walker flew in from Colorado to testify. 
Lenore Walker explained once again the cycles of violence and 
that there were these three cycles and she posited her learned 
helplessness thesis, the two facets of which are 1) the repeated 
battering that the women suffer basically diminishes their incen-
tive to leave making them passive and 2) the belief that they 
cannot control what will happen to them, additionally reinforc-
ing their helplessness. 
I think that this particular case was exacerbated by the de-
fense attorney in the sense that he wasn't quite familiar with 
these type of cases and he hadn't defended a battered woman 
who was accused of having killed her abusive spouse previously. 
What happened is that to the extent that this testimony was 
given on her behalf, the prosecutor was able to rebut this testi-
mony by showing, for example, that she was able to drive to the 
corner, therefore she was not a battered woman. Granted, this is 
perhaps one end of the spectrum of how bad you can get. But in 
terms of other racially specific examples, what had happened 
previously is that I think there were two instances where the 
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police were called to the house and had talked to a neighbor who 
had reported shouts and cries occurring in the house at which 
point they came and arrested both of them. The police arrested 
the husband and wife both for assault. To the extent that the 
prosecutor characterized what had happe~ed as mutual combat, 
once again to the extent that the woman exercised any agency of 
her own that obviously didn't conform to the model. It was re-
ally quite difficult. I think what happened is that the jury looked 
at the model and looked at her and said she's not a battered 
woman. 
Q: If I could just make a comment to that before we take further 
questions, it sounded to me from hearing your compelling story 
Harriette that that must have been what happened in your trial, 
there's no way that the information you communicated and the 
way that you communicated it, it must have been the experts 
that derailed the jury from finding you justified in your actions. 
A: (Harriette Davis): Well, there was quite a bit that helped me. 
I have to say that I had the women's community behind me in 
this area and they helped me to raise money for my defense and 
helped to publicize the whole issue of domestic violence. There 
were people there helping me and supporting me. The project 
that Cookie was affiliated with gave our defense a lot of informa-
tion because at the time, in 1981, there wasn't a lot of informa-
tion about Battered Women. But I had taken the tests, whatever 
they call those tests to prove if I was considered a battered wo-
man or not and my scores were on the high end of the scale to 
say yes, I was. Lenore Walker didn't come and testify for me, 
but they do the tests. The expert witness, Daniel Sonkin, had 
been with the district attorney's domestic violence unit in San 
Francisco and he testified on my behalf. One of the jurors who 
spoke with my attorney after the trial said that the way he por-
trayed my case and explained the battered woman syndrome 
made it seem that I was so perfectly suited to the scenario that 
the jury couldn't believe the expert. They thought that he was 
lying for me. The expert took a $100 initial consultation fee but, 
after that, because he was kind of in awe of how much I had 
been affected that he was willing to testify on my behalf and 
work with me free. So I think that that went against me because 
the jury couldn't believe it, that I was like a textbook case. 
Also, I went to trial a year after the initial act and I had 
changed so much because I was now out of the battering situa-
tion. I had been throug? a semester of school, I had been back 
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with my family, I had made ties in the community, I had people 
who were backing me and I was reading about other people's 
experiences. I was not feeling isolated, basically, I was free as an 
adult woman out on $50,000 bail to do the things that normal 
people can do. So, my whole life was different. I even developed 
another relationship with someone else that was normal and 
healthy. The person that they saw on the witness stand was not 
the person who was being portrayed from the past. It's really 
hard because sometimes now I can distance myself and talk 
about it and not feel real emotional, but at other times, it's very 
hard for me. When I was on the witness stand, I was almost like 
another person, telling my story. There was probably very little 
emotion or anything there, so I think that also went against me. 
There are other things in my background that affected my 
case. I had had a child before getting out of high school, I had 
another child with this man not being married, and so there 
were a lot of things about me that were unconventional and dif-
ferent than the normal that society looks at. So I can say that it 
wasn't only that I was on trial, my past was on trial as well. 
They brought up my health history and there was concern about 
abortions, my belief about life and death, and other things that 
had no bearing on the trial. I was tried for my values which 
might be somewhat different than the middle american person. 
As a matter of fact, they were different, and always had been, so 
they were also on trial. We did have one person of color on the 
jury and I believe we had a few women. Basically, the Alameda 
county jury pool is white middle-class suburbans and my life 
was somewhat different. The other thing was his life was not 
squeaky-clean. But when you're in trial and you're looking at the 
woman and the man, the jury asks itself, if the man is so horri-
ble, then what kind of woman is this that would be with him in 
the first place. The jury therefore began to judge my character 
on that basis too. Now he's dead and they forgive him for being 
this horrible person, but now you're alive and they are judging 
you for even having been with him in the first place. So, those 
are some of the issues that came up at my trial. 
A: (Cookie Ridolfi): I want to just comment a little further on 
that, there's probably not a person in this room who wasn't in-
credibly moved by the story that was just told but I want to also 
say that in my experience in these cases, it's often true that 
women, when they are forced to take the witness stand and tell 
their story, have this one opportunity to explain what has hap-
30
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1993], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss3/5
1993] COURTROOM, CODE & CLEMENCY 859 
pened and what they've experienced and they become different 
people on the witness stand, they clam up. They become upset, 
they become frightened and it's very, very difficult in the con-
text of a trial to convey what their experiences have been. One 
of the women that we filed a petition on behalf of is Francis who 
is 77 years old. She was very frightened of the media attention 
at her trial. She had been battered for forty eight years and one 
of the arguments of course that the prosecutor made at her trial 
was that she should have gone to a shelter. When the battering 
began in that relationship, there was no such thing as a shelter, 
there was no such thing as Battered Woman Syndrome, Lenore 
Walker probably wasn't born yet. She had been in the abusive 
patterned relationship for forty eight years and the prosecutor 
was arguing that she should have gone to a shelter. The point 
that I was trying to make was that in her trial, the judge allowed 
the ·press into the courtroom. She said that she couldn't tell her 
story if the photographers continued to click and take pictures 
of her and if the videocameras remained in the courtroom. De-
spite the trial lawyers' request to the judge that they be removed 
so that she could have an opportunity to tell this story where 
her entire life was hanging on the line like that, the judge denied 
the request. She was convicted. She's serving 15 years to life and 
in her case unless Governor Wilson acts soon, she will surely die 
in prison. 
Q: (Susan Rutberg): Are there any other questions? 
Q: I had a few questions if I could. One is that people that are 
talking about the legislation keep mentioning battering in the 
context of a marital relationship and I'm wondering if that is 
how this legislature is coming in? Is it applying only to spouses? 
A: (Rebecca Isaacs): No, it's not limited. It applies to any part-
nership, any domestic relationship. 
Q: I have one more question for Harriette Davis. Did Henry 
have a history of abuse in his family, had he had a history of 
abusing other people? Was this the first time and do you know 
why he became like .this? 
A: (Harriette Davis): Well, his mother personally told me, which 
she denied in court, that his father used to abuse her. She was 
from Georgia and that's why she brought her children to Califor-
nia. Later on, he came out here, but that's one of the reasons 
why she left him. Henry was a physically violent person, he had 
a friend of fifteen years that he beat down and the man died 
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from complications after he had to have his spleen removed be-
cause of this beating. I knew about that and that was his best 
friend. I don't know all the reasons but there had been abuse in 
his family and I don't know how his father treated him as far as 
spankings. But I know his mother had been abused. And I 
wanted to say that we did not use the Battered Woman Syn~ 
drome as a defense. We did use post-traumatic stress defense at 
that time, but the evidence was brought in to show why I was 
under such stress and duress and what led up to that. It wasn't a 
Battered Woman Syndrome that was used, it was post-traumatic 
stress syndrome. 
Q: One other thing, please. I worked as a law student at a public 
defender's office one time and worked on a domestic violence 
case and we were defending the man who was accused of abusing 
his spouse who ended up not showing up in court, so the case 
was dropped. It was a really hard kind of case to deal with, but 
in that situation, I thought what happened in court was going to 
be bad for the woman and that the best thing for them would be 
to have some kind of forced counseling. In your experience, was 
there a certain period where somebody, whether it be through 
school, education classes could have intervened? Could this have 
maybe prevented what happened or helped you? 
A: (Harriette Davis): Maybe in the beginning, someone could 
have helped me when it hadn't yet gotten to that point where he 
really felt like he owned me. I think that if I had had a strong 
male figure in my life, coming in and saying, look, if you put 
your hands on my daughter or on my sister again I'm going to do 
the same to you. And I really believe this, that's what he would 
have responded to. I did talk to him early on about getting help 
just for myself at first, but he said "No way." And I tried to talk 
to him about the both of us going to talk to someone but he also 
said no. He would not even let me go and talk to my mother who 
did talk to me about getting help and I knew that it wasn't a 
normal situation that I was in. I didn't want to be in it but I just 
felt that I needed to find a way out. I thought I could do it on 
my own. That's the type of person I am. If I had sent him to jail, 
he would have gotten out and he would have came and had me 
killed. So, I don't even doubt that now, and I can tell you I've 
thought about it a lot, as a matter of fact I've had eleven years 
to think about it since he's been dead. I can tell you maybe 
when he was a youngster he could have been helped. I think that 
maybe our society needs to deal with the problem now with the 
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children when they are young. You see all this crap on TV, men 
are men, women are women, they're these two different things 
and it's still going on, this role playing and what people are al-
lowed to do to other people. Violence and ownership of other 
people is ingrained in our society and it's been that way since 
society was started with indentured slaves and then other slaves 
that were brought to this country. It's still that way. If people 
would begin to teach their children differently, that's what is go-
ing to change it. But as long as people think they can own other 
people, then they're going to be treating people like that. We see 
that men, more so in this society, get away with killing their 
wives all the time, that it's okay in the heat of passion. 
A: (Rebecca Isaacs): I just want to make a quick point about one 
of the ways that we were able to get prosecutors interested in 
Section 1107. That section specifically says that it's for use by 
either the prosecution or defense. That's precisely because bat-
tered women make such notoriously bad witnesses either be-
cause they fail to show, because they're afraid and all of those 
other reasons. Battered Woman Syndrome evidence can be used 
by the prosecution in that kind of case of a domestic violence 
battery case to show or explain why she wouldn't show up or 
why she isn't willing to testify or why she is impeaching herself 
and for all of those kinds of things: That's another interesting 
twist. 
A: (Harriette Davis): Let me just say something. The city of 
Oakland (CA), where this happened, had settled a class-action 
lawsuit with the one condition that they address domestic vio-
lence issues. One condition was that two officers were always to 
arrive anytime there was a call for domestic violence. The acute 
perpetrator is to be taken from the area and usually, if there is a 
female officer available, that officer will speak with the victim 
and advise her of her rights, advise her of shelters and options 
available to her. The police are to take the man away and to 
advise him also. There's a lot of different things in that law and 
I'm not familiar with all of them, but I can tell you in 1980, 
when the police were called to my house, that this suit had been 
settled for a year and a half and it still wasn't being 
implemented. 
I don't know how many of you are attorneys yet, I guess 
most of you are law students, I want to say this because I think 
a lot of times when you hear the facts, that you're looking at the 
facts, but when you go to work for someone as an advocate or a 
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lawyer or whatever you have to look at the person as an individ-
ual. There are circumstances when, for example, the woman 
can't deal with cameras. You're going to get a lot of information, 
but then you have to deal with that woman and inform her. 
Don't victimize her anymore. Inform her of her rights, inform 
her of the law and have her be an equal partner in her defense. 
There is nobody who is so ignorant that she can't understand 
what's best for her if you give her the information and let her 
make informed decisions. It's her life, she's the one who will 
spend time in prison, she's the one whose life has been affected. 
What I say to you is you give that person the information so 
that they can, along with you, make decisions that are going to 
affect them legally. Because I know for me it was really impor-
tant that I knew every step of the way what the law was, what 
could happen or not happen and make choices based on that 
information of how I wanted to proceed. I was the one facing 25 
years to life in prison along with the possibility of losing my life 
and my children if I was going to be convicted. So that's some-
thing I think that's really important. 
A: (Susan Rutberg): Thank you. And thank you all for your 
careful attention and I want to particularly thank each and 
everyone of our speakers who shed light on the problem with 
one final word. I think one of the things that we have learned 
here tonight is that justice needs to be tempered with mercy. I 
seem to recall that it was a female, although fictional character 
who gave voice to that. I think it was Portia in the Merchant of 
Venice. Maybe with that idea, we can all, you can all, enter the 
profession and try to see that there is more mercy out there for 
the women who are victims of domestic violence. Thank you. 
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